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41ST ANNUAL FOULSTON-SIEFKIN LECTURE:
THE NEXT WAVE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES AFTER CARPENTER
Matthew Tokson ∗

It is an honor to deliver this year’s Foulston Siefkin Lecture, and a particular
honor to follow in the footsteps of past lecturers like Akhil Amar, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rachel Moran, William Eskridge, Harold Koh, and Ruth Okediji, to
name only a few. My topic today is the future of Fourth Amendment law
following the Supreme Court’s enormously important decision in Carpenter v.
United States. 1
Carpenter extends the Fourth Amendment's protections to sensitive
information held by third parties, a crucial step towards maintaining the Fourth
Amendment's relevance in the digital age. However, the Court’s opinion is
exceedingly vague and cautious with regard to when and how the Fourth
Amendment will protect digital information going forward.
I will argue that the meaning of Carpenter ultimately resides in its detailed
account of the potential harms threatened by a new form of surveillance. The
Court’s explanation of these harms and its concerns regarding unregulated
government surveillance of citizens’ locations take up a large portion of its
opinion. 2 It is this discussion, more than any particular line or technical point of
distinction from previous cases, that will shape the future of Fourth Amendment
law.
Moreover, the Court’s practical emphasis on the risk of privacy harm is not a
one-off or a sharp break from previous practice. Carpenter is consistent with a long
Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. What follows is an
edited and adapted version of the 2019 Foulston Siefkin Lecture, delivered at Washburn
University School of Law on March 28, 2019. My thanks to the Washburn University
School of Law for its invitation, and to the Washburn faculty members and students for
their comments and questions. I also wish to thank Chad Flanders and Hiroshi
Motomura for their helpful comments and advice. Special thanks to Christian Clark and
Connor Plant for excellent research assistance.
1 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
2 Id. at 2215–2220.
∗
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line of Supreme Court decisions ignoring or reshaping previous Fourth
Amendment doctrines when necessary to protect citizens against unchecked
surveillance. 3 It also echoes several previous cases that focus on the revealing,
comprehensive, or intimate nature of surveillance when assessing whether a
Fourth Amendment search has occurred. 4
Looking forward, I will discuss some of the novel surveillance technologies
that are likely to reach the Supreme Court over the next several years or decades.
These technologies include drones, smart homes and devices, web surfing
surveillance, and pole cameras targeting a specific suspect’s home. Many of these
technologies have already been used in police investigations and evaluated by
judges in lower court cases. I conclude by discussing how the Supreme Court is
likely to resolve these cases, applying the framework of Carpenter and its
predecessors to make some tentative predictions about the future direction of
Fourth Amendment law.

I.

THE LAW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES
A.

The Katz Test

The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
require that the government obtain a warrant or qualify for a warrant exception
prior to conducting a “search”. 5

But what is a “search” under the Fourth

Amendment? Most scholars consider the term to be ambiguous and capable of
multiple meanings, and there is no direct drafting history on the subject of the
Fourth Amendment’s scope. 6

See,e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–59 (1967); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
4 See infra notes 67−73 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). There are several exceptions to
the warrant requirement, including exceptions for automobiles, Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), exigent circumstances, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967), and searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969).
6 See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates; Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974). See generally WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, 713 (2009) (“To the
3
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The Supreme Court initially limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment to
“material things” 7 and “constitutionally protected area[s].” 8

This eventually

changed after the development of wiretaps and “bugs” that could record people’s
conversations—technologies that the federal government used extensively and
abusively during the mid-twentieth century. 9 The FBI, for instance, recorded
nearly a half million conversations from the 1940s to the 1960s. 10 It used these
recordings to monitor political groups, record attorney-client conversations,
influence judicial appointments, threaten civil rights leaders, and intimidate or
discredit members of Congress investigating its activities. 11
As these abuses were starting to come to light, the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to include intangible things. In the 1967 case
Katz v. United States, the Court held that government agents conducted an
unlawful search when they recorded Katz’s telephone conversations without a
warrant. 12 The Court rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment was limited to
certain areas or to tangible objects. 13 The majority opinion did not, however, set
out any new test for discerning the Fourth Amendment’s scope. 14
Instead, the famous “Katz test” comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion. He described a two-pronged test as follows: “My understanding … is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that

extent that the direct evidence indicates, the amendment’s ratifiers took their thoughts
about its original meaning to the grave.”).
7 E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (ruling that the text of the Fourth
Amendment expressly limits its coverage to tangible items).
8 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961) (discussing cases holding that
the government did not commit a Fourth Amendment “search” when it did not encroach
on any constitutionally protected area, such as a house or office).
9 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583 (2011);
ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 17, 24–31 (1992).
10 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583 (2011);
ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 17, 24–31 (1992).
11 CHARNS, supra note 10 at 77.
12 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
13 Id. at 350–51, 353.
14 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385
(1974).
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society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 15 In subsequent cases, this test
was simplified, finding a search whenever the government violates a citizen’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” In recent years, the Court has held that acts
of government trespass on constitutionally protected areas may also violate the
Fourth Amendment. 16 But the Katz test dictates the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection in the vast majority of cases.
B.

The Third-Party Doctrine

One of the most controversial applications of the Katz test involves what is
called the “third-party doctrine.” This doctrine provides that that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to personal information disclosed to a third party and
obtained by the government from that party. In Smith v. Maryland, for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
telephone numbers that a customer dialed, in part because the customer had
voluntarily disclosed the numbers to the telephone company. 17 In United States v.
Miller, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect citizens’ bank
records, which were exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of
business. 18
As you might imagine, the third-party doctrine is controversial. It’s especially
problematic in the internet era, when a huge variety of personal data is transmitted
over the internet and processed or stored by a variety of internet service
providers. 19 The third-party doctrine threatens to erode Fourth Amendment
protections for some or all of this data, including emails, web-surfing data, search
terms, subscriber information, email to/from data, shared documents stored
online, and more. 20 In a recent case, however the Supreme Court limited the third
party doctrine’s application in important ways. 21 Scholars and lower court judges
will be grappling with the ramifications of the Court’s decision for years to come.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
17 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
18 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
19 Tokson, supra note 9, at 602–04. For a more direct attack on the third-party doctrine
and Katz’s privacy-based conception of the Fourth Amendment, see Matthew Tokson, The
Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).
20 Id.
21 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
15
16
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II.

UNDERSTANDING CARPENTER
Cell phones work by using radio waves to communicate with cell towers. 22

Cell phone companies typically keep records of when your cell phone signal hits
the various antennae on their cell towers. 23 With this information, they can
determine your cell phone’s approximate location. 24 Cell phone companies
generally store this information for up to five years. 25 In other words, cell phone
location records can reveal the approximate locations and movements of a cell
phone user over a long period of time, potentially revealing intimate and
detailed information about their life. 26
In June of 2018, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Carpenter, a Fourth
Amendment case involving cell phone location tracking. 27 FBI agents suspected
Timothy Carpenter of involvement in a series of robberies in the Detroit area. 28
They requested cell phone signal records from Carpenter’s wireless providers
(MetroPCS and Sprint). 29 These records allowed the FBI to determine Carpenter’s
location 12,898 times over a total of 129 days, an average of 101 data points per
day. 30 With this information, they could place Carpenter within a sector ranging
from one-eighth to four square miles, depending on cell tower density. 31 This
evidence placed Carpenter at the location of several of the robberies.
Carpenter sought to have the evidence suppressed, claiming that it amounted
to a Fourth Amendment search performed without a warrant. 32 The Supreme
Court ruled, in a 5−4 decision, that the government must typically obtain a warrant
before accessing a user’s cell phone location information (CSLI). 33

See Mathew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U.L REV. 139,
160 (2016).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218)
26 Id. at 2217–18.
27 Id. at 2206.
28 Id. at 2212.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2218.
32 Id. at 2212.
33 The Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with
their opinion. Id. at 2223.
22
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By any standard, Carpenter is a profoundly important Fourth Amendment
case. But the Court’s opinion is notably “cryptic,” 34 and just what it means for
future surveillance cases is far from clear.

The Court offered no test for

determining when the Fourth Amendment would protect information held by a
third-party service provider. Echoing the Katz majority opinion, the Court mostly
just described the privacy problems associated with cell phone location tracking
and then declared that such tracking is a Fourth Amendment search.
Can we discern any sort of legal standard or test in the Carpenter opinion? To
some degree. The key doctrinal line in the case is: “In light of the deeply revealing
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable
and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by
a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 35 This nominally applies only to cell phone location data. Moreover,
it would be easy for future courts to limit Carpenter to its facts. CSLI is somewhat
unique in that it is collected automatically and is not voluntarily disclosed by the
cell phone user. 36
Yet in practice, the Court’s approach is likely to extend Fourth Amendment
protections to many forms of digital information. The Carpenter opinion focuses
on the potentially revealing and comprehensive nature of long-term location
tracking. It devotes only a tiny portion of its lengthy opinion to the involuntary
nature of the data disclosure. 37 The Court’s focus on the privacy harms caused by
pervasive digital surveillance suggests that it is these harms, rather than the extent
of consumer disclosure to third parties, that will primarily determine the scope of
the Fourth Amendment going forward. Moreover, Carpenter is not a one-off
decision, nor a drastic break from the Court’s approach over the last several
Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s Blockbuster Fourth
Amendment Decision – Carpenter v. United States, Concurring Opinions, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20180711125830/https://concurringopinions.com/archives/20
18/06/ten-thoughts-on-todays-blockbuster-fourth-amendment-decision-carpenter-vunited35 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
36 See Tokson, supra note 22, at 161−63 (describing how CSLI works and quoting
decisions that mention that citizens are unaware they are disclosing their location to their
cell service providers).
37 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. The court’s legal analysis on this point is limited to
one paragraph. See id. at 2219. The opinion also notes that people “compulsively carry
cell phones with them all the time,” and mentions the number of cell phones in use in the
United States. Id. at 2218, 2212. The Court’s slip opinion ran to twenty-three pages.
34
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decades. It is the continuation of a long trend away from doctrinal rigidity and
towards extending Fourth Amendment protection to new surveillance contexts.
A.

Carpenter and Privacy Harm

The Carpenter opinion is largely premised on the “seismic shifts in digital
technology,” and the greater potential for privacy harm, that cell phones
represent. 38

Thus the Court distinguishes the third-party doctrine cases by

emphasizing the potential harms posed by cell phone location surveillance and the
“detailed and comprehensive record of [a] person’s movements” that it reveals. 39
It repeatedly emphasizes the changes wrought by cell phone technology in general
and cell phone tracking in particular—technological changes that in turn require
legal change. Whereas extended location tracking used to be extremely difficult
and costly, cell phones made it cheap and easy. 40 The location records they
produce are comprehensive and generally cover up to a five-year period. 41
Because these records contain so much information, they can reveal intimate
details about the customer’s life, “revealing not only his particular movements,
but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.” 42
This largely normative analysis drives the opinion.

Because cell phone

location data is so revealing and so easy to obtain in large quantities, the Fourth
Amendment must apply to it. 43 If the data were more costly to gather, or not stored
in such massive quantities, it would be far less of a concern. 44 But because the
privacy harms of CSLI are so substantial, not even clear-cut disclosure to a third
party is sufficient to eliminate Fourth Amendment protection. 45
Finally, the opinion suggests the Court’s increasing willingness to look
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018)
Id. at 2217.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 2218.
42 Id. at 2217 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing US v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
43 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 (“[T]he time-stamped data provides an intimate window
into a person’s life…[and] the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of
historical location information at practically no expense.”).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2220.
38
39
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beyond the facts of a case to its broader implications for Fourth Amendment
privacy. First in Kyllo and then in Carpenter, the Court has looked beyond the
technology at issue in the case and considered the broader surveillance context. In
Carpenter, the Court took account of the rapidly improving precision of CSLI
tracking, noting that while Carpenter’s location could only be determined within
a city-block-sized area at best, location tracking had grown more precise since
Carpenter’s arrest and was likely to continue to advance. 46
B.

The Carpenter Evolution

Carpenter substantially limited the reach of the third-party doctrine in the
digital era, a development with massive implications for privacy in myriad
technological contexts. But the decision itself is more continuous with past Fourth
Amendment decisions than commentators have recognized. 47 It is the culmination
of a long trend towards protection against serious privacy harm, regardless of
other doctrinal factors.
For a start, the Carpenter opinion leans heavily on the approach endorsed by
five Justices in 2012’s United States v. Jones. 48 Across two concurrences in Jones, five
Justices agreed that the continuous monitoring of Jones’s car violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of the fact that the car’s location was
generally disclosed to the public. 49 As in Carpenter, the Justices in Jones focused
heavily on the privacy harms threatened by GPS tracking: cheap and easy
gathering of large amounts of location data with the potential to reveal the details

See id. at 2219. The Court also noted that the Government could infer Carpenter’s
location more precisely by combining his cell phone location data with other information
over time. Id.
47 See Kerr, [new book, or see “Implementing Carpenter on SSRN] (arguing that Carpenter
was a sharp break from previous Katz test cases in that it was not based on property);
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 Harv. J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2019)
(arguing that Carpenter was a radically transformational change in law),
https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bsedj.
48 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413−18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
418−31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority in Jones focused on the fact
that the police physically trespassed on Jones’s property by touching the underside of his
car. Id. at 403–05.
49 Id. at 413−18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418−31 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
46
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of a person’s life. 50 Carpenter describes Jones as a key precedent 51 and states that
“[a] majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.” 52 It
describes how cell phone tracking is in some ways more invasive than the tracking
in Jones. 53 It notes that cell phone tracking is concerning because it is similar to the
GPS technology addressed in Jones. 54 It also cites Jones for the crucial proposition
that exposure to third parties does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection
for pervasive location tracking. 55 Carpenter enshrines the reasoning of the Jones
concurrences in a majority opinion. It also gains the support of Justice Roberts
while losing that of Justice Alito. But its general approach was largely laid out in
the previous case.
To be sure, Carpenter required the Court to confront the third-party doctrine
more squarely than Jones did. The Court’s explicit limitation of that doctrine is a
massive victory for privacy in the digital age. But Carpenter is not the first
indication that the third-party doctrine may matter only in a limited set of contexts.
Indeed, the third-party doctrine has not been applied by the Court since 1979, and
has at times seemed to disappear whenever it would lead to an undesirable result.
Supposedly, the third-party doctrine dictates that exposure of something to a
third party eliminates Fourth Amendment protection in that thing. 56 Yet in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that a state hospital’s program of
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations … The
Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into
the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and
community hostility.”); id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Devices like the
one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and
cheap…society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would
not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period”).
51 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2215.
52 Id. at 2217.
53 Id. at 2218.
54 Id. at 2216 (noting that both forms of tracking data “are detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled”)
55 Id. at 2220.
56 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
50
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testing patients’ urine for cocaine violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact
that patients voluntarily turned over their urine to hospital employees. 57 In Stoner
v. California, the Court held that the police must obtain a search warrant to enter a
hotel room despite the fact that “maids, janitors, or repairmen” routinely enter and
observe the room in the normal course of business. 58 Similarly, in Jones, the routine
exposure of one’s car to members of the public was insufficient to eliminate Fourth
Amendment protection in the car’s location over time. 59

In each case, the

disclosure of information to third parties was overcome by other considerations,
much as it would be in Carpenter.
Moreover, even the Court’s famous third-party doctrine cases Miller and
Smith did not turn entirely on third party exposure. 60 Both considered at length
“the nature of the particular documents sought” and both emphasized the
unrevealing and non-intimate nature of the information obtained. 61 Thus Smith
noted that dialed phone numbers were not “the contents of communications,” and
revealed “neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed.” 62
Smith also held that the government could intercept phone numbers dialed for
local calls, even though no third party recorded these numbers. 63 Miller likewise
stressed that bank deposit slips were not “private papers” and checks were “not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.” 64 Even at the apex of the third-party doctrine’s influence, the
relatively unrevealing nature of deposit slips and dialed phone numbers may have
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). The court granted certiorari
only on the issue of whether the testing met the special needs exception and assumed a
lack of patient consent, but the dissenting Justices noted that the patients’ consent was
obvious and provided a clear basis to resolve the case. Id. at 76; id. at 92−96 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
58 376 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1964).
59 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012).
60 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (discussing this aspect of
Miller and Smith).
61 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (noting the non-intimate nature of dialed
phone numbers); Miller, 425 U.S., at 442 (focusing on the non-sensitive “nature of the
particular documents sought.”
62 Smith, 442 U.S., at 741.
63 Id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment,
especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be dictated
by billing practices of a private corporation.”).
64 Miller, 425 U.S., at 442.
57
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played a larger role than their disclosure to bank employees or telephone
companies. 65
Indeed, while the third-party doctrine has only mattered intermittently in
cases involving exposure of information to third parties, judicial consideration of
the revealing, comprehensive, or intimate nature of surveillance has been a
through-line of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This is especially
clear in recent cases like Carpenter and Jones, where the uniquely difficult questions
posed by location surveillance have compelled the Court to examine factors
relating to privacy harm in detail. 66 But consideration of similar factors can be
found throughout the Katz test cases. Examples include Bond v. United States’s
evaluation of the sensitivity of carry-on luggage, 67 Florida v. Riley’s assessment of
the “intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage,” 68 and United
States v. Knotts’s discussion of the possibility of “twenty-four hour surveillance of
any citizen.” 69 In United States v. Dunn, the Court concluded that police could
visually inspect a barn because they “possessed objective data indicating that the
barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home.” 70 In Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, it determined that the surveillance of commercial property via
sophisticated camera equipment was not a Fourth Amendment search because the
“photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional

See Tokson, supra note 9, at 598−600.
See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218 (“As with GPS information, the time-stamped data
provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations … And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap,
and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button,
the Government can access each carrier's deep repository of historical location
information at practically no expense.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost
such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”); Id. at
430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very
long period.”).
67 529 U.S. 334, 337−338 (2000).
68 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
69 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983).
70 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987).
65
66
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concerns.” 71

In United States v. Place, it emphasized the limited amount of

information disclosed by a drug dog sniff. 72 Numerous other Katz test cases have
relied upon similar considerations. 73
As I have argued elsewhere, the intimacy of the place or thing targeted by a
surveillance practice, the amount of information sought, and the cost of the
investigation are especially important factors driving the outcomes of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment cases. 74 Indeed, the Court’s rulings appear to track these
factors in the vast majority of its “reasonable expectation of privacy” decisions to
date. 75 Ultimately, these principles are a means of assessing the extent of the
privacy harm that a surveillance practice is likely to cause. This assessment
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that the information obtained was “limited both in the
manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure”).
73 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes.”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (“In light of our
society's concern for the security of one’s person, it is obvious that this physical intrusion,
penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests….“It is
not disputed … that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of
private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic.”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality) (“The
undisputed evidence discloses that Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with
any other employees. Dr. Ortega had occupied the office for 17 years and he kept
materials in his office, which included personal correspondence, medical files,
correspondence from private patients unconnected to the Hospital, personal financial
records, teaching aids and notes, and personal gifts and mementos.”); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such
as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980) (“At the time petitioner dumped thousands of dollars worth of illegal drugs into
Cox’s purse, he had known her for only a few days. According to Cox’s uncontested
testimony, petitioner had never sought or received access to her purse prior to that
sudden bailment.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police pat-downs are a “serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and [are] not to be undertaken lightly”).
74 Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
75 Id.
71
72
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powerfully and consistently influences the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Carpenter is another in a long line of cases where the substantial privacy harms
threatened by surveillance practices outweighed any disclosure to third parties, 76
positive law analysis, 77 or empirical claim about expectations. 78 Its enormous
contributions to Fourth Amendment law do not stem from any drastic changes to
the Court’s conceptual approach. Rather, Carpenter makes the Court’s approach
clearer, gives lower courts more guidance on how to address third-party doctrine
questions, and describes how low-cost, revealing, comprehensive surveillance
techniques threaten citizen privacy.

III. THE NEXT GENERATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
Carpenter protects individuals from extensive location monitoring and
expressly limits the reach of the third-party doctrine. It does so largely on the basis
of a practical examination of how revealing and extensive location tracking can be.
Looking forward, it suggests that the Court will protect privacy in several other
forms of digital information that are likewise revealing and low-cost.
Of course, the composition of the Court will impact the outcomes of future
cases. As currently constituted, there appear to be at least five votes for the harmfocused approach observed in Carpenter. Justice Gorsuch also appears to be
concerned about new surveillance technologies and citizen privacy, and may be
willing to apply the Fourth Amendment to novel surveillance practices, albeit
under a very different theory than the other Justices. His opinions as a Tenth
Circuit judge tend to favor privacy rights, sometimes to a remarkable degree. 79 His
See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2223; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85
(2001); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
77 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984); see also California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
78 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12
(1978); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (plurality).
79 See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the
automated scanning of email for child pornography constituted a trespass and thus
triggered the Fourth Amendment, despite a lack of precedent for the proposition that
electronic activity that does not interfere with the function of a computer system is a
trespass to chattels); United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1003–1015 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant before police could
76
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dissent in Carpenter suggested that Carpenter likely had a property right and thus
a Fourth Amendment right in his location information. 80

Indeed, Gorsuch

“reluctantly” ruled against Carpenter largely because his counsel did not raise,
and thus forfeited, any property-based argument. 81
It is difficult to identify any existing concept of property rights that would
extend to business records created by one’s cell phone company. However, if
Gorsuch further develops the theory of property rights in data and electronic
signals hinted at in his previous opinions, 82 he may become an important
supporter of an expansive Fourth Amendment scope.
In the meantime, the majority of the Court is likely to continue to apply the
Katz test and the general approach seen in Carpenter to the next wave of Fourth
Amendment search cases. My goal for the remainder of this lecture is to give a
preview of some of the issues that the Court is likely to confront in its upcoming
Fourth Amendment cases.
A.

Websurfing Data

Records of the websites that a user visits can be collected by a variety of
internet service providers (ISPs) or third-party entities. 83

For instance, ISPs

generally maintain logs of the IP addresses of each website a user visits along with
the volume of data transmitted to and from the user. 84 Some service providers
monitor and retain the URL of each individual page visited by a user. 85 Affiliated
groups of websites may collect the URLs of each page a user sees within their
group. 86 Some entities place “web beacons” on affiliated websites that track in

knock on a homeowner’s door to ask him questions when the homeowner had posted
“No Trespassing” signs on his lawn).
80 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261–2272 (2018).
81 Id. at 2272.
82 See id.; see also Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292; Carloss, 818 F.3d 988.
83 See, e.g., Tokson, Automation, supra note 9, at 588, 603; Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big
Data and Predictive Analytics are Changing the Attorney’s Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. &
TECH 527, 542–43 (2015).
84 Tokson, supra note 9, at 603.
85 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1424–25, 1432–38.
86 See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 1433, 1447–48.
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granular detail the user’s activity on a particular site. 87 These service providers
and website networks can use this information to target advertisements to the
individual user or sell the information to third-party advertisers. 88
The government has surveilled citizens’ websurfing activity and introduced
evidence of it in several criminal cases. For instance, in United States v. Forrester,
government agents installed a “mirror port” on a suspect’s account with an ISP,
enabling them to record the IP addresses of the websites that he visited and the
total volume of information sent to or from his account. 89 The Ninth Circuit held
that this was not a Fourth Amendment search, because internet users have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in web surfing information disclosed to a thirdparty ISP. 90 In United States v. Ulbricht, law enforcement agents collected IP
address data to and from a suspect’s wireless router and used the data to help link
the suspect to an anonymous internet profile. 91 The Second Circuit ruled that this
was not a search, again because users had no privacy rights in data disclosed to a
third party’s servers. 92
As law enforcement officials continue to track users’ internet use in criminal
investigations, more circuit courts will rule on this issue, and the Supreme Court
may ultimately be forced to resolve it. How is it likely to do so?
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is likely to protect IP addresses and other web
surfing information against government surveillance. Such records can be deeply
revealing, especially in the aggregate. 93 Scholars have raised concerns about the
detailed surveillance of citizens’ reading habits, which have the potential to chill
fundamental freedoms of thought and speech. 94
IP addresses, to be sure, typically disclose only the general websites with
which a user communicates. 95 But knowledge of which websites a user contacts,
when and how long they do so, and how much information is sent back and forth
See Segrist, supra note 81, at 542−43.
See Tokson, supra note 9, at 603.
89 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008).
90 Id. at 510.
91 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83−84 (2d Cir. 2017).
92 Id. at 96
93 See, e.g., Ohm, Many Revolutions, at 23 (draft on file).
94 See,e.g., id.; Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 436 (2008).
95 See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2148 (2009).
87
88
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has the potential to reveal the subject matter and often the content of the user’s
web surfing communications and activities. 96 Even if government agents cannot
know with utter certainty what an internet user is reading or seeing, compiling
records of the IP addresses that users visit offers the government a revealing and
invasive look into users’ personal habits, interests, and communications. 97
The disclosure of such information to third parties is unlikely to eliminate its
Fourth Amendment protection. Much as it did in Carpenter, the Court is likely to
declare that the revealing and comprehensive nature of web surfing data poses
high risks of serious privacy violations and thus requires special protection. In
such cases, “the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself
overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.” 98 Moreover, while
users do disclose the IP addresses they visit to their ISPs, such disclosure is hardly
avoidable in the modern world, where web surfing is as routine and as essential
as reading paper media or visiting retail stores. 99 Nor is it likely that most internet
users have even the most basic awareness of how internet routing, IP addresses,
or TCP/IP protocols work. 100 If a voluminous record of the places where citizens
travel in public is too private for the government to obtain without a warrant, the
same is likely to apply to a voluminous record of everywhere they travel in
cyberspace.
B.

Smart Homes

Increasingly, our homes are filled with internet-connected devices, from
“smart” speakers like Amazon’s Alexa, to Roomba vacuums, to internet connected
refrigerators and other appliances. These items can be useful and fun, but nearly
all of them collect a great deal of data about their users. This data may be
especially sensitive, as it is gathered from inside the home and/or from items worn
on users’ bodies. Although courts do not yet appear to have opined on whether a
warrant is required for police officers to gather such data from service providers
or other intermediaries, officers have begun to collect it during criminal
See id. at 2148−51.
See id.
98 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
99 See Kerr book, draft at 47.
100 See generally Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 139 (2016) (discussing knowledge of new technologies and how it pertains to a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
96
97
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investigations.
For example, one man was indicted for murdering his houseguest after his
smart utility meter indicated that he had used a large amount of water late at night,
possibly to hose down the murder scene. 101 Prosecutors also sought recordings
made by the man’s Amazon Echo. 102 Another man was charged with murdering
his wife after her Fitbit data showed her moving around after she had supposedly
been killed by an intruder, and his key fob showed that he was home after he
claimed to have left for work. 103 And a suspect charged with aggravated arson
and insurance fraud ran into trouble when data obtained from his pacemaker
contradicted his story of smashing his bedroom window and fleeing after being
awoken by a fire. 104
The potential for government officials to obtain data about the inside of
citizens’ homes has raised serious concerns among scholars and commentators. 105
Carpenter itself does not address smart home devices, and future courts could
easily distinguish them from cell phone tracking. Cell phones are ubiquitous in
modern life, and the disclosure of cell phone users’ locations happens
automatically and likely without cell phone users’ knowledge. 106 Most smart

Haley Sweetland Edwards, Alexa Takes the Stand: Listening Devices Raise Privacy
Issues, Time, May 4, 2017, http://time.com/4766611/alexa-takes-the-stand-listeningdevices-raise-privacy-issues.
102 Id. The charges against Bates were eventually dropped at the prosecutor’s request.
Nicole Chavez, Arkansas judge drops murder charge in Amazon Echo case, CNN.com, Dec. 2,
2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/amazon-echo-arkansas-murder-casedismissed/index.html
103 Justin Jouvenal, Commit a crime? Your Fitbit, key fob or pacemaker could snitch on you,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/commit-a-crime-your-fitbit-key-fob-or-pacemaker-could-snitch-onyou/2017/10/09/f35a4f30-8f50-11e7-8df5c2e5cf46c1e2_story.html?utm_term=.88b43a23d1ef.
104 Lauren Pack, Arson suspect in unique case featuring pacemaker data is back in custody, THE
JOURNAL-NEWS, July 24, 2018, https://www.journal-news.com/news/arson-suspectunique-case-featuring-pacemaker-data-back-custody/dn6JyzsOemZovpayJMZLNJ/
105 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 Cornell L. Rev.
547, 603 (2017) (describing various smart devices and police interest in the data they
generate); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936–
40 (2013) (discussing how the Internet of Things is “subjecting more and more previously
unobservable activity” to observation).
106 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2270 (2018); Mathew Tokson, Knowledge
and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 139, 187 (2016).
101
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home devices remain very much optional, and even popular devices such as smart
speakers (like Alexa) are found in fewer than a quarter of US households. 107
Moreover, when users engage with smart speakers, it is relatively clear that they
are disclosing information directly to an internet-connected device. 108 Because the
disclosure of information to third parties is more volitional and less automatic in
the smart home context than with cell phones, it is certainly possible that a future
court would hold that the third-party doctrine eliminates Fourth Amendment
rights in information disclosed to smart home devices.
This is, however, an unlikely outcome. First, the Supreme Court has protected
the privacy of the home in a wide variety of cases, even against relatively minimal
privacy intrusions 109 and even when precedent or logic appeared to dictate a
different result. 110 Second, Carpenter’s discussion of voluntary disclosure takes up
only a tiny portion of the majority opinion, and the issue does not appear to greatly
concern the Justices. 111 And finally, the enormous privacy harms that would result
from warrantless government surveillance of recordings and other sensitive
information from the inside of people’s homes are likely to motivate the Court to
distinguish or disavow any prior doctrines that would counsel against declaring
such surveillance a Fourth Amendment search.

Even more so than the

surveillance in Carpenter, obtaining recordings of people’s homes could be
extremely revealing and could paint a comprehensive picture of their private

Micah Singleton, Nearly a Quarter of U.S. Households Own a Smart Speaker,
According to Nielsen, THE VERGE, Sep. 30, 2018,
https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/9/30/17914022/smart-speaker-40-percentus-households-nielsen-amazon-echo-google-home-apple-homepod
108 To be sure, users may not understand in any meaningful way that their information is
stored on third-party servers.
109 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41
(2001).
110 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013) (holding that a drug dog sniffing the air
outside of a home was a search despite the lack of any actionable trespass, which United
States v. Jones had seemed to require, and despite several precedents holding that dog
sniffs of personal properties were not searches); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 720
(1984) (holding that tracking a radio beeper inside of can inside of a home was a search
despite the imprecision of the beeper, which revealed only the can’s presence in the
general area of the house, and the Court’s conclusion that police could lawfully track the
beeper until it entered the house and as soon as it left).
111 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
107
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lives. 112 The Court is again likely to address these concerns, regardless of what a
strict application of the third-party doctrine might dictate.
C.

Pole Cameras

Pole cameras refer to cameras placed on utility poles or street lights for the
purpose of observing persons or property. Such cameras are widely used in cities
throughout the country, and have been employed by federal agencies as well as
local police departments. 113 Perhaps the most interesting legal question arising
from the use of pole cameras involves cameras that constantly record video of the
exterior of a residence and its curtilage. Although most courts have held that longterm video surveillance of the exterior of a home is not a search, other courts
disagree. 114 Moreover, lower courts may be less reluctant to find that pole cameras
are a search in the post-Carpenter era. In any event, it is somewhat likely that the
issue of pole camera surveillance of residential property will eventually reach the
Supreme Court.
The facts of pole camera cases may vary, as the cameras may be covert or
obvious, may observe the entirety of a suspect’s yard or just a portion, and may
capture video for a few weeks or several months. 115 Typically, the cases involve
See id. at 2217−18 (discussing GPS’s ability to expose the “privacies of life.”); Austin
Carr, et al., Silicon Valley Is Listening to Your Most Intimate Moments, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 11, 2019 (discussing the “intimate” and “intense” Alexa recordings
that Amazon employees listened to and analyzed).
113 Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 Cameras Help Chicago’s Crime Problem?, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (May, 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-policesurveillance.html; Justin Rohrlich & Dave Gershgorn, The DEA and ICE are Hiding
Surveillance Cameras in Streetlights, QUARTZ (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://qz.com/1458475/the-dea-and-ice-are-hiding-surveillance-cameras-in-streetlights/.
114 Compare United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, at *27 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15,
2014) (suppressing evidence from a pole camera used to record the outside of an
individual’s home for six weeks), and South Dakota v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 111 (S.D.
2017) (holding that long-term video monitoring of the area around a mobile home was a
search), with United States v. Cantu, 684 F. App’x 703, 705 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that
video surveillance of the outside of a house was not a search); United States v. Bucci, 582
F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2009) (same), and United States v. Gilliam, No. 02:12-CR-93, 2015
WL 5178197, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015) (same).
115 See, e.g., United States v. Stefanyuk, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110080 (D.S.D.) (police
installed a high-definition camera for two weeks); United States v. Kay, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 142861 (E.D. Wisc.) (police used a pole camera to video surveil as suspect’s home
for eighty-seven days, but the camera was largely pointed at the driveway rather than the
112
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monitoring a front yard for several weeks or more, from a vantage point not
meaningfully different from that of a passerby on a public street.
In general, cases holding that video surveillance of the exterior of a home is
not a search conclude that defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy
because the exterior of their home is exposed to the public. 116 Yet Carpenter rejected
similar reasoning about the exposure of information. The Court emphasized that
mere exposure of something to third parties will not necessarily render it
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. When a surveillance practice is especially
invasive, comprehensive, and/or inescapable, it may be prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment regardless of whether the information it captures might in theory be
observed by others.117
Courts finding the use of pole cameras to be a search generally focus on the
continuous, long-term nature of the surveillance at issue. Pole cameras capture
“activities outside [the] home twenty-four hours a day.” 118 Such surveillance is
“electronic,” “continuous,” “intrusive[],” far lower in cost, and easier to hide than
traditional, in-person surveillance. 119 Further, as one court noted,
[T[his type of surveillance does not grow weary, or blink, or have
family, friends, or other duties to draw its attention. Much like the
tracking of public movements through GPS monitoring, long-term
video surveillance of the home will generate “a wealth of detail about
[the home occupant’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.” 120
These observations echo those later made by the Supreme Court in Carpenter.
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court expressed concern about the continuous
and voluminous nature of cell phone tracking, which “provides an allencompassing record of the [user’s] whereabouts” and does so “at practically no
expense.” 121 Cell phone tracking, like continuous video monitoring, is “not about
house); United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116312 (D. Mass.) (police
monitored a house and apartment building with a pole camera for seven months).
116 See,e.g., Bucci, 582 F.3d at 117.
117 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
118 South Dakota v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 112 (S.D. 2017)
119 United States v. Vargas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, *22, *26 (E.D. Wash 2014).
120 State v. Jones, 2017 SD 59, *P36 (S.D. 2017) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
415 (2012) (Sotomayor , J., concurring) (alteration in original)).
121 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
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… a person’s movement at a particular time.” 122 Rather, it creates “a detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over
several years,” and is accordingly a Fourth Amendment search, even if momentary
or in-person tracking of a suspect would not be. 123
The resonances between Carpenter and the cases holding long-term pole camera
surveillance unconstitutional suggest the Court is likely to rule that such
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment. Although one’s movements in
public are in theory observable by others, the constant tracking of a person’s
movements for long periods of time by technological means violates their
reasonable expectations of privacy. 124 Similarly, although a house and its curtilage
are in theory exposed to public view, people reasonably expect that their houses
will not be constantly surveilled for weeks or months by a hidden camera. While
the outcome of the pole camera issue remains uncertain, especially given the many
lower court precedents upholding their warrantless use, it is ultimately probable
that the Supreme Court will find long-term pole camera surveillance of a residence
to be a Fourth Amendment search.
D.

Drones

A drone is an unmanned aircraft guided by remote control or an onboard
computer. Law enforcement and other public safety agencies in 49 states have
acquired drones for various uses. 125 The most widely owned model used by such
agencies has a 20-megapixel camera capable of shooting high resolution video or
still photos. 126 It can be controlled at a distance of 4.3 miles and has a top speed of
45 miles per hour. 127 Like most drones operated by public agencies, its surveillance
capabilities are somewhat limited by its maximum flight time of thirty minutes. 128
Still, drone capabilities are improving, and many military-grade drones can

Id. at 2220.
Id.
124 Id. at 2217; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
125 Dan Gettinger, Public Safety Drones An Update, at 3 (May 2018),
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/05/CSD-Public-Safety-Drones-Update-1.pdf.
126 See id.
127 https://www.dji.com/phantom-4-pro
128 Id.
122
123
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remain airborne for several days. 129 Some commercially available drones offer
autopilot modes, including modes that allow for constant camera surveillance of
a specific building, object, or location. 130
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court heard cases involving airplane and helicopter
surveillance, and these rulings are relevant to the Fourth Amendment status of
drones. In California v. Ciraolo, police officers chartered an airplane that flew 1,000
feet over Ciraolo’s property, and the officers visually observed marijuana plants
in Ciraolo’s back yard. 131 The Court held that visual observation of the curtilage
of a home from an airplane operating in publicly navigable airspace was not a
Fourth Amendment search because it did not violate Ciraolo’s reasonable
expectations of privacy. 132 The Court reached a similar holding in Florida v. Riley,
concluding that visual observation from a lawfully operated helicopter was not a
Fourth Amendment search. 133 In both cases, the Court emphasized that the aircraft
were operated in compliance with applicable regulations, and suggested that only
unlawful flights would violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 134
The likely outcome of a future drone surveillance case will depend on the
particular facts. If police officers were to lawfully operate a drone in order to
surveil a suspect’s yard for half an hour, it is likely that the Court would find such
surveillance constitutional under Ciraolo and Riley. Although such surveillance
would be cheaper than helicopter or airplane surveillance, it would still be
analogous to observation by a manned aircraft. It is unlikely that any differences

See Luke Dormehl, 7 Drones that can stay airborne for hours—and the tech that makes it
possible, Digital Trends (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/droneswith-super-long-flight-times; Praveen Duddu, The 10 longest range unmanned aeriel vehicles
(UAVs), Air Force Tehnology (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.airforcetechnology.com/features/featurethe-top-10-longest-range-unmanned-aerial-vehiclesuavs.
130 See See, e.g., Klint Finley, World’s Smallest Drone Autopilot System Goes Open Source,
WIRED (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/drone-autopilot;
https://www.dji.com/inspire-1/app#autopilot;
131 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
132 Id. at 213−14.
133 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227 (1986) (holding that taking precision photographs of a factory from an airplane was
not a Fourth Amendment search).
134 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (“We would have a different case if flying at that altitude had
been contrary to law or regulation.”); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239 (“it is open to the
view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace”).
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between piloted aircraft and manually flown drones would be important enough
to distinguish the Court’s prior cases. It would also be relatively easy for the
officers to comply with federal drone regulations, which set no minimum height
for drone flight. 135 The regulations do prohibit drone flights during night hours,
but drone operators can apply for a waiver so long as they demonstrate that the
operation can be conducted safely. 136 Some state laws prohibit drone surveillance
without a warrant, but most do not. 137
Continuous, auto-piloted drone surveillance for an extended period of time
would likely yield a different result. Prolonged visual surveillance of a person’s
curtilage would begin to resemble the comprehensive, invasive surveillance that
the Court identified in Carpenter and the Jones concurrences. 138 The government
could obtain a detailed record of the homeowner’s comings and goings, who
visited their home and when, and any actions they or their family members take
in their front or back yard. As with extended location monitoring in public,
observers could build up a revealing dossier of information about an individual’s
associations and activities around and (via inference) inside of their home. 139 It is
unlikely that the Court would allow such harmful government surveillance to go
unregulated, even if the drone flight complied with all applicable laws and
regulations. Just as the third-party doctrine did not eliminate citizens’ privacy
interests against cell phone location tracking, mere compliance with drone
regulations is unlikely to eliminate homeowners’ privacy interests against
extended video surveillance of their curtilage. In other words, the Court would
likely require the police to obtain a warrant before engaging in extended drone
surveillance of a suspect’s yard.

14 C.F.R. § 107.1−107.205.
14 C.F.R. § 107.29, § 107.205.
137 National Conference of State Legislatures, Taking Off: State Unmanned Aircraft Systems
14 (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/transportation/TAKING_OFFSTATE_%20UNMANNED_%20AIRCRAFT_SYSTEMS_%20POLICIES_%20%28004%29.p
df; National Conference of State Legislatures, Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law
Landscape, Sep. 10, 2018, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmannedaircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx.
138 See supra note 123.
139 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (“revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations’”) (quoting Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012).
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Predicting the future of Fourth Amendment law is necessarily an uncertain
and imprecise endeavor. The composition of the Court could change, the Justices
could change their minds, or the law itself could be transformed by subsequent
cases. There is likewise no guarantee that the surveillance technologies described
above will reach the Court, or that other, as yet unknown techniques will not
supersede the ones described here.
Looking toward the future is nonetheless important, especially in the
surveillance context. In doing so, “[t]he best way to suppose what may come, is
to remember what is past.” 140 The next wave of Fourth Amendment challenges is
likely to come from technologies that are increasingly ubiquitous, like drones and
smart devices, and those on which lower courts have already ruled, like web
surfing and pole cameras. And the Court’s approach in future cases is likely to be
an extension of its approach in previous cases that dealt with then-novel
surveillance technologies.
When law enforcement practices capture information that is particularly
revealing or comprehensive, and thereby threaten too much harm to citizens’
privacy, the Court is likely to require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
This is true regardless of doctrines or precedents that seem to point in the other
direction—though such doctrines may still play a role in borderline cases.
Carpenter is hardly the first case to exemplify the Court’s concern with the nature
and extent of the harms caused by modern surveillance. It is nonetheless a major
step forward for privacy, and the clearest indication yet that the Fourth
Amendment will maintain its relevance in the digital age.
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